DESIGNING OUT CRIME

SUPPLEMENTARY PLANNING DOCUMENT
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PLANNING AN ATTRACTIVE AND SAFE ENVIRONMENT

The purpose of this document is to provide clear guidance for developers and planners to ensure that all development proposals incorporate the principles of designing out crime. It explains how crime prevention measures can be incorporated into a scheme from the start of the design process and the benefits of doing so. It sets out the commitment of the Royal Borough to crime prevention, what to consider during the preparation of a scheme, and how the Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Design Adviser can help.

Crime and fear of crime have a considerable impact on both the life of individuals and their wider community. It is well documented that good planning and design have a major role to play in reducing crime and thus people’s fear of it.

This advice is applicable not only to large scale schemes; the basic principles can and should be applied to most developments. Whilst crime prevention is one of many factors which have to be considered in the planning process, with careful design an attractive and secure environment can be achieved which also contributes towards good urban design, as well as meeting other legislative requirements (e.g. Fire and Building Regulations).

HOW CAN DESIGN REDUCE CRIME?

1.1 Crime is the product of many factors. However, research has shown that design is one element that can influence the occurrence of crime - both positively and negatively. The aim of ‘Designing Out Crime’ is to reduce the vulnerability of people and property to crime by removing opportunities that may be provided inadvertently by the built environment. It also aims to reduce fear of crime and, in doing so, helps to improve people’s quality of life.

1.2 Designing security into a project need not increase costs, and can be more economical in the long term. However, it does require some thought and imagination. The best solutions often result from a co-ordinated approach; bringing together the ideas and experience of the developer, the designer, the local authority, the police and the community.

POLICY CONTEXT

LOCAL GOVERNMENT POLICY

2.1 The Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea is committed to crime prevention and the development of safe, sustainable communities. The Community Strategy in which the Council and all its partners are brought together cites ‘Safer Communities’ as one of its seven key themes. Objective 2 of the Council’s Strategic Environmental Assessment/Sustainability Appraisal is to reduce crime and anti-social behaviour and the fear of crime.
2.2 ‘Designing out Crime’ is considered to be an important part of its planning function. The Unitary Development Plan (soon to be replaced with the Local Development Framework) requires that any development takes user safety into account and policy CD39 states that:

‘The design of new and altered buildings or areas adequately takes into account the safety and security of the users of the facilities and that of neighbouring residents’

CENTRAL GOVERNMENT POLICY

2.3 The Crime and Disorder Act 1998 established that the responsibility of reducing crime does not fall solely to the police. Section 17 requires that Local Authorities exercise their functions with due regard to their likely effect on crime and disorder, and to do all they reasonably can to prevent crime and disorder.

2.4 The DCLG Planning Policy Statement 1 (PPS1), “Delivering Sustainable Development”, recognises that the planning system is an important factor in successful crime reduction and notes that crime prevention is capable of being a material consideration when planning applications are considered. It provides guidance on the handling of design issues including crime prevention, referring to a local authority’s need to achieve high quality and inclusive design and have regard to the good practice set out in the DCLG ‘Safer Places’ document.

2.5 The DCLG recent “Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention” provides guidance on how good planning can reduce crime by ‘designing out’ opportunities for crime and ‘designing in’ community safety. This concept is more recently known as Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, or CPTED. The guidance bases the attributes of safer, sustainable communities on seven key principles:

**Access and Movement:** Places with well-defined routes, spaces and entrances that provide for convenient movement without compromising security;

**Structure:** Places that are structured so that different uses do not cause conflict;

**Surveillance:** Places where all publicly accessible spaces are overlooked;

**Ownership:** Places that promote a sense of ownership, respect, territorial responsibility and community;

**Physical Protection:** Places that include necessary, well-designed security features;

**Activity:** Places where the level of human activity is appropriate to the location and creates a sense of safety at all times;

**Management and maintenance:** Places that are designed with management and maintenance in mind, to discourage crime in the present and future.
2.6 In designing any development proposal this guidance should be borne in mind. A checklist of this guidance can be found in Appendix A.

CRIME IN THE ROYAL BOROUGH

3.1 Kensington and Chelsea is not a high crime area. Government figures for November 2004 place the Borough outside the top 40 local authorities deemed to be ‘high crime areas’. In 2006/7 24,328 crimes were reported to the police in the Borough compared with 24,731 the previous year (a reduction of 1.6%).

3.2 However, whilst overall reported crime is reducing, fear of crime continues to be a matter of concern. It is often environmental factors and design that contribute to this fear and engender the opportunity for, or perception that, crime will take place.

FINDING A SUITABLE SOLUTION

4.1 It is widely acknowledged that planning system can have a positive impact on tackling crime issues at the design stage. For this reason it is essential that early discussions between developer, planning authority and Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Design Advisor take place. It is important that a proactive approach is taken at an early stage incorporating Crime Prevention through Environmental Design, rather than relying on reactive measures such as CCTV, which should only be used as part of a package of measures to reduce crime.

4.2 The main principles of designing out crime are based on the notion that most crime is opportunistic. There are two main principles that underlie most measures to design out crime. By using design measures to increase natural surveillance and define ownership of public and private space, a sense of community can be fostered where potential criminals are made to feel unwelcome.

4.3 Natural surveillance relies on observation - people and property visible from occupied buildings are less vulnerable than those out of sight. The fear of crime can also be reduced in places which are in continuous occupation and where people are passing or looking on. The orientation of entrances and windows to buildings can encourage surveillance and ‘self-policing’. Good lighting is an important tool.
4.4 **PUBLIC AND PRIVATE SPACES** should be clearly defined to deter unauthorised access into clearly ‘private’ areas. Public and private spaces can be separated by low walls, changes in surfacing materials or other symbolic entrance features. Door entry systems also ‘create’ areas of defensible space in multi-occupied buildings, as well as helping to restrict unauthorised entry.

Front garden walls clearly define the boundary between public and private space.

4.5 The crime prevention measures appropriate for a specific development or building will often depend on the location of the site and local crime patterns, as well as the type of development. General crime pattern information can be found on the Metropolitan Police website.

4.6 It is also important to consider the effect of crime prevention measures on properties adjacent to a development, and the personal safety of people. A ‘Fortress Approach’ is discouraged as it tends to be unattractive and can result in an oppressive environment for both residents and passing pedestrians. It is also inappropriate in many of the historic settings within the Borough. A balance has to be struck between maintaining an attractive environment whilst achieving effective prevention of crime in the urban areas.
WHAT DOES THIS MEAN IN PRACTICE?

5.1 In every development there are a number of aspects of design that should be considered to reduce opportunities for crime. At the planning stage the main features are:

- layout
- land use
- parking
- open spaces and landscaping
- streetscape
- boundary treatments
- CCTV
- lighting
- target hardening measures
- management and maintenance

Every site is unique and not all features will be relevant or desirable in all developments. However, specific advice and guidance on a planning proposals can be obtained from the local Metropolitan Police Crime Prevention Design Adviser.

LAYOUT

5.2 Layout is the most difficult aspect of a development to correct once built. Designers should consider the following at an early stage in the design process:

- Will the development allow adequate natural surveillance of both people and property?
- How will the scheme define public and private areas? How will this affect the appearance of the development?
- How well will the scheme fit into its surroundings? Will footpaths be convenient, attractive, safe to use and adjacent to vehicular routes?
- New development should maintain and enhance permeability and connectivity, which can aid surveillance and security by increasing activity.
- Gated developments will generally not be permitted.

LAND USE

5.3 A good mix of uses within a development or a building can be beneficial in crime prevention terms. A mix of commercial and residential use (including a mix of housing sizes) is more likely to keep premises constantly occupied, making for better surveillance. However, care should be taken to ensure that entrance, parking and service arrangements to each of the uses do not compromise the security of the whole building.
5.4 Particular uses may raise specific security issues. Housing, schools, hospitals and medical centres, community facilities, leisure and entertainment facilities all need to be treated differently.

PARKING

5.5 All car parks should be designed for both vehicle and personal safety. They should be well lit; have clear lines of sight; and avoid nooks and crannies which provide opportunities for concealment. Vision splays, mirrors, light-coloured wall finishes and good floor to ceiling heights can all help to create a safe car park. Close circuit television (CCTV) may be employed to monitor car parks, but is no substitute for good design.

5.6 Underground car parks raise particular concerns, as they do not generally benefit from natural surveillance in the way that a surface level parking area might. In private parking areas and shared public/private car parks, the hours of access for vehicles and pedestrians should be carefully considered, as well as any internal linkages. Secure cycle storage areas should also be treated with the same care and attention.

OPEN SPACE AND LANDSCAPING

5.7 Open spaces should be designed for maximum surveillance to encourage their use rather than misuse. Pedestrian routes through open spaces should be carefully designed to ensure safety and convenience, and have good overall levels of lighting and clear signage.

Duke of York’s Square invites pedestrians to use the space and maximises informal surveillance
5.8 Landscaping can be a useful crime prevention tool as it is versatile and can be used to perform a variety of design functions. Careful placing of suitable plant and tree species can reduce opportunities for concealment or vandalism (including graffiti), and help define public and private spaces. Good deterrent plants such as Berberis, Robinia and Rose varieties can be employed where suitable. Conversely, poorly designed and maintained landscaping schemes may obscure views and create shadows and places for people to hide, thereby encouraging opportunist criminals and increasing fear of crime.

5.9 In terms of surveillance, landscaping can be critical. Factors such as growth characteristics of plants and their placement in relation to potentially vulnerable areas are extremely important. Visual corridors must be maintained in open, park-like areas as well as in densely planted areas. As a rule visual surveillance corridors can be maintained by limiting the maximum height of shrubbery and the minimum height of the lowest branches on trees. Specific advice can be obtained from the Crime Prevention and Design Advisor.

5.10 An additional benefit of landscaping in terms of crime prevention is its contribution to making a place attractive which generates a sense of pride and ownership.

STREETSCAPE

5.11 Well-designed street furniture and public art in streets and public places can contribute to a safe and distinctive urban environment. Poorly designed and sited street furniture and clutter can lead to an increase in crime and fear of crime. Street furniture should not obstruct pedestrian views or movement or be positioned to encourage anti-social behaviour. A small design change, for example, the inclusion of dividing arm rests on benches may have a significant effect in preventing misuse. Street furniture and public art should be designed to respond to the local townscape.
5.12 Walking routes and transport nodes can be targets for crime. Particular attention should be made to keep these areas free of obstruction and to provide improved lighting.

**Boundary treatments**

5.13 The treatment of boundaries should be tailored to each site. ‘Tunnel effects’ created by long expanses of building or high walls should be avoided. Alongside and rear boundaries, sturdy fencing or brick walls to a suitable height with railings for surveillance could be used. A landscaped buffer may be an effective deterrent to unauthorised entry, particularly if thorny or prickly shrubs are used. This can also help reduce opportunities for graffiti.

5.14 Spaces that have an unclear purpose, or whose boundaries and ownership are poorly defined are prone to criminal activity and vandalism. The use of physical barriers such as fences and gates, and psychological barriers such as changes in road and pavement surfaces are encouraged to help make intruders feel unwelcome. By removing an excuse for entering a site, the opportunity for intruders to commit a criminal act is significantly reduced.
5.15 Whilst solid barriers such as walls and fences may be a deterrent to crime, they can have a deadening effect on the street scene. ‘Active’ frontages to buildings and interesting and innovative design treatments can reduce the need for physical barriers. (See also paragraph 5.20 below on shopfronts).

**CCTV**

5.16 The use of CCTV in crime prevention is well documented. However, its main role should be to complement good design which itself encourages natural surveillance and the continuous occupation of buildings and spaces. Crime prevention measures incorporated into the design of a development can be cost effective by reducing the need for ‘add on’ security equipment such as CCTV at a later date. CCTV schemes should be developed in accordance with established codes of practice and the images made available for the local police. Issues of misuse resulting in overlooking and invasion of privacy should be considered when locating CCTV. There may also be issues of visual intrusion caused by cameras and poles.

**LIGHTING**

5.17 Good lighting should be used to improve natural surveillance beyond daylight hours and reduce fear of crime. Lighting plays a part in creating a feeling of territoriality. It can influence an individual's perception about his environment in aesthetic terms as well as safety. This, however, should not detract from the street scene or cause light pollution. In some cases lighting might not be appropriate as it may not be prudent to encourage use of a space after daylight hours. For example lighting of some parks at night may be discouraged. All proposals should incorporate good, consistent and well-designed lighting and any lighting proposals should seek to achieve a high level of uniformity and avoid the use of low-pressure sodium (orange) lamps.
TARGET HARDENING MEASURES

5.18 Making a development as secure as possible is an effective way of reducing crime. However, overly defensive and hostile measures such as external roller shutters on commercial premises and the use of barbed wire and broken glass on boundary walls can obstruct natural surveillance and provide a focus for anti-social behaviour.

The introduction of such measures can adversely affect an area and undermine the aim of making a place or street safer as the perceptions of people living and visiting the area are that it is unsafe. Such measures are often considered to be triggers of crime or an indication that crime is likely to take place.

5.19 In addition, due to the high quality environment in the Royal Borough, there may be conflicts between property owners’ desire for various ‘add on’ security measures, and the Council’s statutory duty to pay special regard to the protection of listed buildings, and to ensure that alterations preserve or enhance conservation areas. To this end, specific advice in relation to architectural theft, window shutters, grilles and bars, security (including blast-resistant) glass and other physical security works to such sensitive sites can be obtained from the Conservation and Design Team at the Town Hall, in consultation with the Metropolitan Police.

5.20 Proposals for new shop frontages should avoid the use of external roller shutters as these create an unattractive frontage, attract graffiti and vandalism and engender a perception of crime in an area.

5.21 Advice regarding detailed matters such as window and door design, locking devices or electronic security equipment is key, and can let an otherwise well designed scheme down at the final hurdle. Advice can also be obtained from Police Crime Prevention Design Advisors. Further information can be obtained from ‘Secured by Design’ guidance and developers should have regard to this when preparing proposals.

Solid roller shutters create a poor environment.

Effective security glass reduces the need for roller shutters.
5.22. A key element in the security of houses in multiple occupation or flats is the front door. The main entrance from the street should close properly, be capable of resisting bodily pressure and slipping of the door lock. Electronic entry systems should not have ‘tradesmen’ buttons. Solenoid based, bolt-action locks are preferred, as they cannot be put on the latch and require less maintenance. Security of mail is important, so, where possible, separate secure external or through-the-wall letterboxes should be provided. Further site and risk specific advice should be sought from the local Crime Prevention Design Advisor.

5.23. Terrorism can pose a very real threat in some areas of the Royal Borough. It is beyond the scope of this document to deal with these threats in detail, but the Council will work with the counter terrorism security advisers (CTSAs) on a case by case basis.

5.24. Chemicals and other hazardous materials might be targets of criminal activity. The siting and design of storage facilities should be the subject of particular care.

**MANAGEMENT AND MAINTENANCE**

5.25 Effective maintenance is key to retaining sustainable, attractive and crime-free areas in the long term. Crime is more likely to occur where places become untidy and show ongoing evidence of neglect such as broken windows, overgrown shrubbery, abandoned vehicles or graffiti. High standards of maintenance will encourage active use and civic pride in an area.

Parking areas should be well-designed rather than an afterthought.

5.26 Developers should give consideration to long-term management objectives, maintenance specifications, responsibilities and funding requirements to ensure that the development and amenity of the area continue to be enjoyed.
REDUCING CRIME DURING DEVELOPMENT WORKS

6.1 Building sites are a frequent target for burglars. Sites can be at risk if adequate security measures are not taken, and scaffolding can make adjacent properties just as vulnerable to attack. Police Crime Prevention Design Advisors can provide site specific advice.

6.2 Hoardings erected around building sites should have slats diagonally fixed to the surface in order to prevent the attachment of fly-posters.

ARCHITECTURAL THEFT

7.1 Listed buildings are particularly vulnerable to architectural theft. However, almost any building with historic fixtures and fittings (both internal and external) can be a target for thieves who make large amounts of money reselling architectural artefacts. Architectural theft occurs most frequently when buildings are vacant, undergoing building work or when sales particulars, with photographs, are produced for sale or let.

7.2 Specific advice on the security of architectural artefacts can be obtained from the Police Crime Prevention Design Advisor. However it is important that if a property is likely to become vulnerable, appropriate security measures are introduced to reflect the value of the artefacts. A photographic record should be kept of all potentially valuable and/or vulnerable items.
THE PLANNING PROCESS

8.1 From the earliest stages of project planning and design, the Council and Police crime prevention design advisors will work with the developer to ensure that proposals have incorporated the principles of designing out crime. When appropriate, it will be included in planning briefs. Development control is key to ensuring that all proposals reduce crime, fear of crime and anti-social behaviour. All proposals and planning applications should demonstrate how crime prevention measures have been considered. This should be included in a Design and Access Statement where appropriate.

8.2 In proposals where crime prevention issues are likely to be significant, developers are strongly encouraged to enter into pre-application discussions with planning officers and crime prevention design advisors to identify and resolve any potential conflicts. Where the Council considers that a proposal would undermine crime prevention objectives, it may refuse permission unless amendments can be made.

8.3 The Council may also consider imposing planning conditions as part of the permission to ensure that the proposal does not compromise community safety. In some circumstances the Council may negotiate a Section 106 planning agreement with a developer in order to create a safer environment.

FURTHER INFORMATION

9.1 This advice note has been prepared primarily to provide guidance for developers and their agents. It outlines some of the measures that can be incorporated into designs to deter criminal activity. This advice is by no means exhaustive and should be used as a starting point upon which designers can evolve their ideas. However, designers should ensure that the proposals reflect the advice found in ‘Secured by Design’, and ‘Safer Places – The Planning System and Crime Prevention’ guidance.

See overleaf for CONTACTS
CONTACTS
For more information please contact

PLANNING INFORMATION OFFICE
Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea
Town Hall
Hornton Street
London W8 7NX
Tel: 020 7361 3012
Email: planning@rbkc.gov.uk
Web: www.rbkc.gov.uk/planning

CRIME PREVENTION DESIGN ADVISOR
Metropolitan Police
Kensington Police Station
72 Earl’s Court Road
London W8 6EQ
Tel: 020 8246 0757
Email:
Web: www.met.police.uk/kensingtonandchelsea

COMMUNITY SAFETY TEAM
Whitlock House
72-74 Earl’s Court Road
London W8 6EA
Tel: 020 7795 6660
Email: commsafe@rbkc.gov.uk
Web: www.saferbknc.co.uk

ARTS AND ANTIQUES UNIT
Metropolitan Police
Wellington House
67-73 Buckingham Gate
London SW1E 6BE
Tel: 020 7230 2150
Web: www.met.police.uk/artandantiques
USEFUL WEBSITES
ACPO Crime Prevention Initiatives
www.acpo.police.uk

British Parking Association
www.britishparking.co.uk

British Standards on-line
www.bsonline.bsi-global.com/server/index.jsp

CABE.
www.cabe.org.uk

Cleaner, Safer, Greener; re public spaces
www.cleanersafegreener.gov.uk

CCTV. Home Office Scientific Development Branch (HOSDB)
http://scienceandresearch.homeoffice.gov.uk/hosdb/cctv-imaging-technology/

CCTV Operational Requirements Manual
www.crimereduction.gov.uk/cctvminisite25.htm

Counter-Terrorism. The Centre for the Protection of National Infrastructure (CPNI)
http://www.cpni.gov.uk/

‘Countering International Terrorism: the United Kingdom Strategy’

Data protection legislation and guidance provided by the Information Commissioners Office (ICO) CCTV codes of practice

Design against Crime – Projects and some MO’s
www.homeoffice.gov.uk/crime-victims/reducing-crime

‘Design and Access statement’
(Guidance on best practice on producing effective statements)

Designing out Crime Association (for all built environmental professionals)
www.doca.org.uk
Domestic Burglary
www.crimereduction.gov.uk/burglaryminisite01.htm

Environmental journal view on the clean Neighbourhoods and Environmental Act 2005
www.ehj-online.com/archive/2000/may2005/may2.html

General crime pattern information can be found here.
http://www.met.police.uk/crimefigures/index.php

Gloucestershire Design Checklist

Home Office crime reduction website
www.crimereduction.org.uk

The Housing Corporation
(Funds new affordable homes and regulates housing associations in England).
http://www.housingcorp.gov.uk/

Housing Corporation website
(Grant-funded developments contained within the 2008-11 NAHP).
(More specific for SBD).

Lighting. The Institution of Lighting Engineers (ILE)

‘Manual For Streets’ –
(It supersedes Design Bulletin 32 and Places, Streets and Movement,
which are now withdrawn). (2007)
http://www.dft.gov.uk/pgr/sustainable/manforstreets/

Metropolitan Police
http://www.met.police.uk/

MI5 Security Advice
www.mi5.gov.uk

Office of Public Sector Information
www.opsi.gov.uk

Information in Park Mark can be found at:
http://www.britishparking.co.uk/index.php?path=2,64
‘Personnel Security Measures for Laboratories’
http://www.nactso.gov.uk/pathogens.php

Policing policy, anti-social behaviour, alcohol, community safety
www.homeoffice.gov.uk

‘Protecting against Terrorism’. MI5

Public space in towns and cities
www.groundwork.org.uk

Street lighting
www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/cm200203/cmselect/cmsctech/747/74707.htm

Recessed areas in buildings: guide

http://www.communities.gov.uk/index.asp?id=1502936

‘Safer Parking Scheme’ (Association of Chief Police Officers (ACPO))
http://www.britishparking.co.uk/index.php?path=2,64,155

‘Safer Schools and Hospitals Toolkit’
www.crimereduction.gov.uk/toolkits/ssh00.htm?n44

‘Secured by Design’ by the Association of Chief Police Officers
www.securedbydesign.com

‘Security of Pathogens and toxins’. Office of Public Sector Information
http://www.opsi.gov.uk/si/si2002/20021281.htm

Social and built environmental research – Joseph Rowntree Foundation
www.jrf.org.uk

Sustrans: Civil engineering charity that designs & builds routes for cyclists, walkers and people with disabilities
www.sustrans.org.uk

The conjunction of criminal opportunity
www.crimereduction.gov.uk/learningzone/ccoh.htm
The Design Council's Design Against Crime initiative
www.designagainstcrime.org

‘Under Lock and Quay - Reducing Criminal Opportunity by design’
Published by British Waterways, in partnership with the London Metropolitan Police.
http://www.britishwaterways.co.uk/images/bwl_14_UnderLockQuay_tcm6-105772.pdf

Urban engineering - cycle sheds etc
www.urbanengineering.co.uk/index.php
APPENDIX A

Safer places - check list
In designing and considering development proposals, the following points should be considered:

Access and movement

1. Have the consequences of the number and nature of all the connections been considered?
2. Do all routes lead to somewhere people want to go? Are all routes necessary?
3. Do routes provide potential offenders with ready and unnoticed access to potential targets?
4. Are routes for different users segregated when they could be integrated?
5. Is it easy to understand how to travel through an area?

Structure

1. Have the types of building been selected and designed with security in mind?
2. Is the layout of the development appropriate for the identified crime risk, as well as to meet wider planning objectives?
3. Will all users in an area be compatible and have potential conflicts been thoroughly thought through?
4. Does all public space serve a purpose and support an appropriate level of legitimate activity?
5. Have the remodelling, removal or re-use of buildings and spaces that are vulnerable to crime been considered?
6. Have the potential benefits for crime prevention of restoring historic environments been considered?

continued on next page...
Surveillance
1. Are opportunities for surveillance from the subject and adjacent buildings maximised?
2. Will those most likely to observe any criminal or anti-social behaviour respond appropriately?
3. Are both of the above true at all times of the day, week or year?
4. Have efforts been made to eliminate ‘inactive’ frontages and corners?
5. Where appropriate, such as in public buildings, does the design allow for high visibility into buildings or site?
6. Are parked cars highly visible but secure?
7. Has lighting been a primary consideration in planning out crime?
8. Is the standard of lighting and its maintenance regime adequate and is it resistant to vandalism and damage? Is it well designed and well sited?
9. Is CCTV the best way to solve the particular problem and is it the most effective use of resources?
10. Is the CCTV part of a wider package of crime prevention measures?
11. Will the resources be in place to maintain the CCTV system, including staff to monitor and respond to the pictures, in future years?

Ownership
1. Will it be clear to users – including potential offenders and capable guardians – which space is public, communal, semi private, and private?
2. Are the boundaries between public, communal, and private space signified in the most appropriate manner, be it a physical barrier or a psychological barrier, such as changes in paving, surface texture/colour, landscaping and signage?
3. Will the place have an identity of its own?
4. Are all those who should feel ownership involved in defining the place's identity?
5. Are the barriers a high quality of design in their detailing and appropriate to their local context?

Physical protection
1. Have the ‘target hardening’ principles of Secured by Design been addressed?
2. Has the potentially negative visual impact of crime prevention measures been addressed and, where these cannot be ameliorated by good design, have the advantages been weighed against their adverse impacts?
**Activity**

1. Will as many law abiding people as possible be attracted to use the public realm?
2. Is there a strategy for encouraging residential population in town centres?
3. Should the evening economy be nurtured, and if so is it diverse and inclusive?
4. Are mixed uses successfully integrated with one another?
5. Are all uses in an area compatible, and have potential conflicts been thoroughly addressed?
6. Will what attracts people to the public realm uphold its attractiveness?

**Management and maintenance**

1. Has care been taken to create a good quality public realm?
2. Are appropriate facilities management systems in place? Does the design and layout support these?
3. Are users, businesses and residents, involved in management?